I'd like to again try to set down the main points of what I take to be the central argument. I want to set out those points and then elaborate a bit on some of them.
First of all, in trying to set down these points, it seems I must explain exactly what I mean by "central." What do I mean by the central argument?
I mean that in philosophy there are arguments that pertain to the most all-pervasive and deepest issues. Those problems are more or less central to the concerns of philosophy.
What might those concerns be, pray tell? I mean the usual concerns having to do with what we mean by knowledge or values, are there such things as knowledge or values, is it possible to have them. Having read even a few philosophers, one gets the impression that the skeptic has an argument that should not be ignored. There might not be any such thing as knowledge or values. I say"should not" be ignored because most philosophers, and most everyone else, does ignore what the skeptic has to say. Surely, philosophers have tried to show that the skeptics arguments do not, or cannot, demonstrate that knowledge or values do not exist or are impossible.
http://www.cc.gla.ac.uk:443/layer2/core_modules/a_r_t.php
The central argument has to do with skepticism. The central argument has to do with the creation of the skeptic. It has to do with why we have skepticism.
In order to get this argument out to look at it, I'd like to just write it down as I first thought of it....Well, of course, I didn't just think of it. I want to write down how I rethought it a few days ago.
The first part goes something like,
"We do not have to listen to these guys because they disagree with us on the basics about the points at issue..."
There is a question among normal non-philosophical non-academic people about how relevant philosophy is to our day to day lives. Bertrand Russell spoke about the doubts people have about the value of philosophy, saying,
"...what is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the influence of science or of practical affairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless trifling, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.
This view of philosophy appears to result, partly from a wrong conception of the ends of life, partly from a wrong conception of the kind of goods which philosophy strives to achieve. Physical science, through the medium of inventions, is useful to innumerable people who are wholly ignorant of it; thus the study of physical science is to be recommended, not only, or primarily, because of the effect on the student, but rather because of the effect on mankind in general. This utility does not belong to philosophy. If the study of philosophy has any value at all for others than students of philosophy, it must be only indirectly, through its effects upon the lives of those who study it. It is in these effects, therefore, if anywhere, that the value of philosophy must be primarily sought. "
http://skepdic.com/russell.html
Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy
I want to say how limited Russell takes the value of philosophy to be. To the practical affairs of the world, Russell seems to think philosophy has very little to add. That is, if valuable minds add anything to the world, then the value of philosophy is indirect. We might contrast the value of science with the value of philosophy. Whereas the scientist might discover some facts about the world that allows her to make a device that makes work done better, like a better mouse trap, or which dispels some ignorance about the world that dispels some fear or anxiety. Science has direct practical benefits, according to Russell. Philosophy can only benefit the world by making philosophers better people.
There is the idea that conflict in the world is a matter of violence and threats and that the "academic debating" that philosophy demands is completely out of place. The only appropriate response to the people who disagree with us and act accordingly is to destroy them. Russell seems to agree that philosophy is just a matter of hair splitting and about matters we could never have knowledge, like the number of angels who could stand on a pinhead. As that is the case for Russell, the situation that makes conflict a war zone could not be anything philosophy could do anything to solve. It's completely out of philosophy's hands, on Russell's view.
Contrary to Russell and those who believe the world is a war zone and the resolution of conflict involves the destruction of one's enemies, philosophy is central to some of the most important questions we face. I recognize that you'd not think it from the role that philosophy plays in the world as we know it. The place it is particularly important is in our understanding of conflict, argument, and what I take to be the central question involving the means and ends of life. In any conflict, we have a bunch of people who disagree with us over whatever point we have between us. Russell agrees that philosophy is about splitting hairs and how many angels can stand on pinheads, but he does not conclude from that beginning that philosophy has no value at all. He goes on to argue that it makes better philosophers and that in itself makes for a better world. In making this point Russell is not far from the view Socrates took. Socrates argued that because of the way our lives were like the lives of his cave-dwellers, people who were good at philosophy, and hence able to get beyond the illusions of the cave walls, would make the world better. Russell and Socrates shared the same view about the limitations and value of philosophy.
http://www.units.muohio.edu/chdlt/publications/newscenter7-1.htm
I put together a discussion awhile back about what people might do about there being only one sandwich left between them. I think philosophy begins in considering this kind of example and others where we have to understand our role as arguers, about what we provide as arguments, and what those arguments are supposed to do for us.
The statement I've given here about not having to listen to people who disagree with us challenges one of the things we might have assumed about an argument. If there is only one sandwich left, and we are concerned about what we are going to do, thinking pretty soon, for example, we will all be getting hungry, you'd think that if we gave an argument, then others should have to listen to us. And, if others gave arguments about what they think should be done, then we should have to listen to them. Because the giving of these arguments puts before us some way of solving a problem that we all face in there being only one sandwich left between us. I presume to say (above) that those people like Socrates and Russell don't commit themselves to listening to people who disagree with them about basic issues like what we should do about the last sandwich, the last glass of water, maybe the last barrel of oil, and so on. They don't think listening is important because the world is a war zone and listening to others is useless if not counter-productive.
I went on to say,
"...because "sound" arguments are good enough for us, so we don't have to engage these arguers. Conflicts are not resolved by engaging in disputes with arguers. They are instead resolved by appealing to the truth about the world. The argument that best reflects the way the world is wins. Winning arguments resolve arguments."
I take it this is the core of Don Levi's account of logical argument. I've introduced Levi's account of logical argument in the past. It goes like this: "...an argument is a statement that is given support, support that takes the form of a statement or statements." (Don Levi, Critical Thinking and Logic, page 212.) I take it that Levi might be puzzled by what I have said here. He might be surprised that I take his account of logical argument to be about arguments being related to connections to the world rather than some engagement with the arguments of other arguers. But the contrast is plain in how this account of argument is contrasted with the account of argument he provides for "critical thinking." That one goes thus, "An argument is given when an arguer takes a position or stand on an issue and offers support or backing for it." (Don Levi, ibid, page 27) Notice here that this account differs with the account of argument offered by logic in that for critical thinking, argument is a matter of arguers taking positions about controversies, whereas logic's account involves no such context, only positions and their support.
I go on,
"The argument that best reflects the way things really are wins, and so all other arguments need not be acknowledged. The truth is out there despite however the animosity generated by conflict betrays us."
I have been struck by the assumption that the world is a matter of warfare, and that conflict is about smashmouth violence. It is this assumption that makes arguing as a matter of debate or bringing up positions and their support seem so fruitless and beside the point. How can we waste our time being so academic when conflict demands strong brutal measures? How can we afford to forgo stealth, deceit, and violence when that is what conflict demands? And why does conflict demand this? Because our opponents do not agree with us about the basics and there seems to be no way to get them to come around to our point of view.
The person who presents the truth should be able to win out amongst others who lie, cheat, or steal in presenting their case. Maybe there is here the presumption that conflict resolution is mostly about truth-telling. If people would not lie, or somehow fudge on the facts, there wouldn't be any conflict. I'm not sure if conflict really is just a matter that could be resolved by getting at the facts and the way things really are by telling the truth. I mean, there may be other reasons why there is conflict. Maybe people don't agree on what the facts are, or how to interpret those facts. There may be other reasons for conflict than just some kind of dissembling. But this assumption seems to lead to the idea that we don't have to engage with other arguers in trying to resolve a conflict.
I then go on to say,
"We don't have to engage in the substance of disputes because sound arguments are determined by the form of arguments, in general, and not at all in the content of particular arguments."
There is a distinction here between the form of an argument and the content of an argument. It is the form of an argument that is logically valid. Its validity goes to whether it's a logically good argument. The content of the argument is related to the specific details of the subject matter of the specific argument. It's the claims about the content that are true, or false, and the form of the argument which is valid, or invalid.
The virtue of any argument like logical argument which are matters of form and content is that neither what we get from form, i.e., the soundness of the arguing, or the content, i.e., the truth of what is claimed, requires any consultation or agreement from the arguers who oppose us. We can, seemingly, resolve arguments without their cooperation, or even with their opposition. This would seem to be an advantage for someone like Socrates or Russell who is committed to the idea that our goal is personal survival instead of the resolution of these conflicts, meaning a resolution where no participant walks away unsatisfied.
I've claimed here that Levi promotes the kind of argument that involves a distinction between their form and their content. Logic is an example of such a way of thinking. Rhetoric is another. We should stop and wonder how the distinction between form and content originated. I want to say that this distinction is something we could say about logical arguments, or even rhetorical arguments, but not arguments in the way understood by critical thinking understood as involving controversies, positions, and their support.
http://www.tau.ac.il/Research-Authority/trends/rapa3.html
Remember that an argument according to critical thinking involves several arguers who present their own positions and support. My thought is that we would not decide which arguer has the better argument by the form of their argument. They might all have the same form to their argument. Say, the form of all their arguments happened to be:
If p, then q.
P, therefore q.
In this case, there would be no way to decide that one argument was any better because of their form because there would be nothing that distinguishes their form. Instead, the way we would determine the better argument might be to look both at how they argued, and at the substance, or content, of what they say, e.g., their claims and the supporting evidence that they would provide.
It sounds good to say that logic tells us whether we have sound or valid arguments, but we have to question whether logicians, or even rhetoricians, are talking about the soundness or validity of the kind of arguments that occur when some dispute arises between people. For one thing, since logical arguments are not about controversies, and it's arguments about controversies that we compare and contrast when people are arguing about something, logical arguments cannot be involved in arguments between people. In fact, I want to say it is the fact that logical arguments are not about controversies in the same way that rhetorical arguments are that makes disputation in terms of sound arguments that makes complete skepticism of knowledge possible. If we claim reason is a matter of logical argument, then knowledge and its cousin values are impossible.
Levi tells us that there is a problem with logic and rhetoric standing alone. It seems to him that argumentation cannot be understood if one looks at either logic or rhetoric alone. His solution to this problem is to suggest that we think of them as working together. He wants us to think of argumentation as being about "logical arguments in rhetorical contexts." I want to remind ourselves of what Levi does say:
"...Critical Thinking or Logic? Which is the best approach to the critical thinking of argumentation? Which approach offers the most helpful lessons?...
As a term, 'Critical Thinking' has different uses...
As used in this book, the term seems to be a synonym for 'Rhetoric' because most of the first part of the book is written from the viewpoint of Rhetoric. For example, to determine whether an argument has been given, you are told to consider whether the speaker or writer is engaged in an argument. By contrast, Logic has nothing to say about the need to consider whether any arguing is being done, whether the position taken is on a controversial issue. To properly read an argument, you need to take into account the audience being addressed, the point of view of the arguer, the issues that divide the arguer from his or her opposition. Nothing was said about the need to consider these aspects of the rhetorical context in the lessons on Logic....
The real issue between Logic and Rhetoric is over what is involved in appraising an argument. The rhetorical context may be important in reading an argument, but how is it important in appraising it? Take the question of the audience for the argument. For Logic, an argument is directed to someone whose only question is, "Given the premises, does the conclusion follow?" So there is no need to identify the audience. Or consider the question of point of view. For Logic, it does not matter why someone argues as he does, all that matters is whether his argument is any good. Or take the question of what is at issue between the parties to the controversy. For Logic, it does not matter whether there is any fight. All that matters is whether sufficient support is offered by the premises for the conclusion. So, rhetorical context does not seem to be relevant to the appraisal of an argument.
What makes for a good argument? According to the rhetorical approach, the answer seems to be that an argument is correct if it satisfies its audience. If that is the answer then you can see what is wrong with it: the criterion of correctness is subjective. Such a criterion would be appropriate for judging the persuasiveness of the argument, but not for its correctness.
...Why is the arguer giving this argument? What are her interests and concerns? Is she writing or speaking from experience, and if so, what is that experience? These are all questions you are encouraged to ask in the chapters on point of view. And there is the same problem with all of them:
Rhetoric encourages you to commit the genetic fallacy of confusing how someone came to think or speak of something with whether it is justified.
It goes wrong by encouraging you to interest yourself in such personal matters as who is giving the argument and why she is bothering to do so, instead of teaching you to think logically about an argument.
Contrary to what Rhetoric suggests, as thoughtful readers, your only interest should be in the truth. You do not care why someone is giving the argument; your only interest is in whether the argument is any good. If it is, then on the assumption of the truth of the premises, you have a very good reason for believing the conclusion is true....
...Logic is not concerned with whether an argument persuades or convinces anyone, only with whether the argument itself is any good. Rhetoric, by contrast, is interested in the effect of the argument on its intended audience; Logic has no interest in whether the argument even addresses an audience, let alone whether it has any effect on it. From the point of view of Logic, an argument's correctness is a completely objective matter, dependent solely on logical considerations....
Why does a choice have to be made between Logic and Critical Thinking? Instead of continuing with the attack-and-response process, another approach suggests itself--that of trying to combine the best features of both Logic and Critical Thinking into one set of lessons."
(Don Levi, ibid, pages 425-430)
He rephrases this last point earlier on,
"...A conflict between the two approaches can be avoided by having Logic take these rhetorical considerations into account. First, give a reading based on a study of the rhetorical context, then take that reading and restate it as an argument in strict form. By taking advantage of what Rhetoric has to offer, Logic would be in a position to combine the advantages of each approach."
(Don Levi, ibid, page 426)
After reading these passages of Levi's I have to wonder whether we are in any position to carry out the task that he asks of us here. How are we to put Logic and Rhetoric back together is we don't understand how they were rent asunder? How can we figure out their end when we don't understand their beginning? Levi talks about the beginnings of Logic in Aristotle, and the Indian Buddhists, but he never explains the argument wherein they found it. Somewhat before Aristotle, Parmenides argued that it's difficult to understand how logic could itself be objective when by any of the ways we would think to give their terms meaning, either subjectively or objectively, we would find it impossible to get at the truth. This is just to say that Parmenides would question whether Levi or anyone else could determine any kind of context for a logical argument, something Levi does not seem to wonder about at all.
So, it seems we have to have some kind of account of how Logic and Rhetoric are related and how they came to be divided as Levi thinks they are. Levi does not go into that question. I want to argue that there is a way of understanding how Logic and Rhetoric are divided. I want to say this account is not new to me, but it can be found in the Republic, where we hear about Thrasymachus and the myth of Gyges.
My argument continues,
Our understanding of the form of arguments, in general, involves the idea that arguers are intimidated into ignoring each one of the the elements of an argument understood as involving controversy, position, and support. So, Gyges pressures his subjects into ignoring the grounds of any dispute, i.e., the controversies wherein it's relevant that others have positions and evidence that we should consider. Gyges pressures his subjects to ignore what each of them cares about the most, so that they are unable to thereby see that they should have evidence to support positions taken on controversies. And, he pressures his people to ignore their own positions on issues and how those positions are related to what they care deeply about, so that they are unable to see a problem and understand how to resolve their problems in light of what they care most about. It is the application of the threat of harm that makes us think our own reason is just a matter of going from one place to another, and hence a matter of general form and particular content.
By intimidating arguers into adopting the claim that reason is just a matter of arguments understood as form contrasted with content, people are thereby unable to rely on reason to resolve conflicts. As Parmenides points out that on this account of reason, there is no way for us to see what the truth might be. People are not only intimidated into adopting an account of reason that cannot work, but they have to go on denying that they have any problem with that state of affairs, because the point is that the goal of life is survival instead of the resolution of conflict, and the best means of survival is through force, and all that made necessary by the intimidation that Gyges places on his subjects.
Our going along with Socrates' victory over Thrasymachus in the Republic, was not so much a victory over a poorly reasoned justification for the rule of tyranny, but instead the victory of a well reasoned argument for tyranny involving the adoption of Gyges methods. The myth of Gyges is just the argument that reason is a matter of the form contrasted with the content of an argument, where this contrast is something arguers accept because they would suffer harm otherwise.
It may be surprising to some what goes on in the kitchens of fancy restaurants. There may be more dirt and scum smeared around the working parts than one would care to have anywhere near where food was being prepared. The cooks may not be sanitary, or courteous. The food may itself not be as fresh as it is made to appear when it reaches your table. This is the disconnect between Levi's account of Logic and Rhetoric and the way their distinction is prepared in the philosopher's kitchen. Levi went on talking about the food as it appeared on the plate, suggesting that the preparation could not matter once the cooking and prep work was done. His only problem was in explaining to us how the separate items arranged on the table could be understood as a meal. It is our lot to wonder whether it's a nutritious and healthy meal and hence to wonder just what went on in the kitchen before everything got out to the table.
My opposition to Levi's account of argument is just my rejection of the prevailing understanding of reason. That understanding involves, at least, the claim that reason involves having sound or valid arguments where what we conclude follows from our premises. One of the points that Levi tries to make is that rhetoric needs to be included in any complete account of reason.
The problem for Levi is to try to put logic and rhetoric together without ever having to explain why we have them both where they seem incompatible in the first place. Unfortunately, the best if not only explanation of how we come to have this distinction between logic and rhetoric as two kinds or argument that Levi thinks should be thought of together involves arguers being intimidated into accepting this distinction because they've been threatened if they do not. Adopting the Socratic or Russellian account of reason is just to go along with this acquiescence.
Whereas Levi confuses "critical thinking" with rhetoric, we need to see there is a difference between the account of argument given from the point of view of "critical thinking" involving controversy, position, and support, which cannot be understood in terms of form and content, and an account from the point of view of rhetoric involving controversy and position, say, that does involve a distinction between form and content.
Levi contrasts rhetoric with logic as being between subjective rhetoric verses objective logic. However, when we expose the fact that "critical thinking" is distinct from rhetoric and Parmenides claims that logic and any form of argument understood to be a matter of a form and content distinction could not be objective, there comes into focus an alternative to Levi's account of reason.
The proper contrast is between "critical thinking" which offers its unique account of argument involving controversy, position, and support, and attenuated 'argumentation' understood to involve a distinction between these 'argument' forms and their content. These quasi arguments include Logic, Rhetoric, and a way of arguing I call Utopian.
The difference between the two accounts of reason involve whether or not arguers submit to intimidation. The genesis of Levi's account of reason involves his arguers agreeing to ignore much of what makes an argument, giving in so that they would not be harmed. What they ignore allows us to then characterize the kinds of argumentation that remains in terms of the form and content distinction. The force, stealth, and violence is applied, much as Thrasymachus maintained, in the service of the powerful who believe that efficacious reason is not in their interest.
http://www.thefreedictionary.com/argument
Philosophers have usually rejected this criticism of Levi. They have ridiculed the idea that you could separate reason, or rationality, from logical argument or rhetoric. The thought is that one must thereby be advocating some kind of irrationality. Without logic, there would be no standards for our reasoning. We could not then determine what would make a good sound argument.
The point of my attack on Levi's account of reason is to show that even if we are able to show that we can have valid or sound arguments, those arguments do not contribute to doing what one intends to do with arguments. Sound arguments do not resolve conflicts. Conflicts are not resolved by resorting to logic because one has to be forced to agree, if that is possible to do, that the terms of these arguments have anything to do with the various parties to any controversy.
Logic is the study of a formal system, the forms of arguments, and as they are much like games, with a sense all of their own, they are in any case beside the point in any dispute.
The basis for my denying that reason has anything to do with logical argument, or rhetoric for that matter, is the fact that the account of argument that Levi offers us as being from "critical thinking" involving controversy, position, and support is genuine and distinct from the accounts of argument offered by logic, rhetoric, and utopian thinking, that involve combinations of only two of the three elements offered by "critical thinking."
Insofar as Levi would not even claim an explanation wasn't an argument because the issue about which one claimed a position and gave support wasn't controversial, we have good reason to be skeptical that logic, rhetoric, or utopian thinking are arguments of even an attenuated sort.
With that in mind, the story Parmenides gives about the two ways of giving meaning to the terms of these attenuated arguments involving a form/content distinction, are just excuses we adopt to explain to ourselves why we've given up everything that's valuable in order to avoid harm.
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